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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
VIRGINIA REES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 8619

vs.
GEORGE ARCHIBALD,
Defendant and Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts giving rise to this action and to the prosecution
of this appeal are as follows:
Respondent is assignee of an account incurred at Madison Memorial Hospital in Rexburg, Idaho, as a result of in-
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jury sustained by Keith Archibald in an automobile accident.
Keith is the minor son of appeallant whose custody was
awarded to Keith's mother Eva Archibald on Jan. 4, 1946
under a decree of divorce entered in the State of Idaho in
the case of Eva Archibald vs. George Archibald, which
decree made no provision for support to be furnished by
appellant (R 18).
At the tim·e of the accident Keith being 16 years of
age was, without the knowledge or consent of appellant,
taken to Madison Memorial Hospital, (R 6) whereupon ap·
pellant was called to the hospital and was requested by
personnel at the hospital to assum·e the obligation of Keith's
being cared for by the hospital which appeallant refused to
do ( R 4). Keith had not been adopted by another prior
to the accident ( R 5). The decree of divorce entered in said
action by which custody of Keith was awarded to his mother
was never modified or amended (R 7).
Counsel for appellant and respondent stipulated to
the evidence in the case ( R 4, 5, 6, 7) .
The trial court entered judgment against appellant in
the full amount of the claim, being the sum of $1372.42
principal, $144.35 interest and $13.20 costs, for a total sum
of $·1529.97 (R 14).

II.
POINTS RELIED UPON
( 1 ) The court erred in finding that the son received
reasonable and necessary medical care, and that no part
of the charges had been paid.
( 2) The court erred in finding that the care and
services rendered to the son of defendant (appellant) were
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necessary for the preservation of the life and health of the
son.
( 3) The court erred in denying appellant's motion
for dismissal.

( 4)

The court erred in rendering judgment against

appellant.

III.
ARGUMENT
It appears that this case is one of first im pression in this
1

state.
Point I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SO~
RECEIVED REASONABLE AND NECESSARY MEDICAL
CARE, AND THAT NO PART OF THE CHARGES HAD
BEEN PAID.
There is no evidence supporting this finding. Appellant through counsel stipulated that the boy was hospitalized
at Madison Memorial Hospital as a result of an automobile
accident, that he received the medication claimed and that
the charges were reasonable for the area ( R 4), but the stipulation went no further. There is no evidence to the effect
that the services were necessary to the extent that it is claimed
they were rendered. Nor is there evidence showing that no
part of the charges had been paid. By this argument appellant does not ignore the facts as stipulated to for appellant
did not stipulate that medication was necessary to the extent
it is claimed it was rendered. The burden of proof was on
respondent as to these matters particularly inasmuch as appellant denied the allegations of the complaint paragraph 2
alleging the indebtedness owing by appellant and further
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alleging that the services and medication were necessary for
the benefit of said minor child (R 1, 2).
In 20 Am. Jur. Sec. 135, page 138, Evidence we find
the following statement of the law:
"The fundamental principle is that the burden
of proof in any cause rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue and remains there until
the termination of the action."
foot note 14 to this section cites Wood v Auburn 87
Me. 287, 32 A. 906, 29 L.R.A. 376 holding that he
who asserts something to be due him, not he who denies
a debt, has the burden of judicial action and proof.
Appellant does not here contend that he claims he had
paid on the account, his position is that the mother being
primarily responsible, having received custody of the boy
under the decree of divorce, was first obligated to pay, and
no showing was made as to whether any demand had been
made upon the mother or whether the mother had paid on the
account. This was, as is appellant's position, pre-requisite
to any claim or right of action against appellant.
As to the nature of the services rendered by the hospital
after appellant had refused to guarantee payment of the
account, the account record reflects the fact that the
boy remained in the hospital far in excess of two
months. Under the circumstances appellant was in no position to consult with representatives of the hospital as to the
need or necessity for medication and hospitalization to the
extent claimed to have been rendered, the fact is the hospital
was in practically the position of having a blank check signed
by appellant, provided appellant were to be held on this ac-
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count. Nor is there any showing that the mother was consulted
as to necessity for the services performed and the expenses
incurred. Appellant is mindful of the fact that emergency
services come within the implied authority rule, but there
is no such showing in this case and if there were the extent of
the services for the length of time charged could not be
claimed under that rule of law. There is no legal presumption
in this case that the services rendered to the extent and in the
amount charged were necessary, the presumption of acceptance of benefits does not here apply where one other than he
who receives the care is called upon to pay for such services.
Point 2.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CARE
AND SERVICES RENDERED TO THE SON OF APPELLANT WERE NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION
OF THE LIFE AND HEALTH OF THE SON.
The argument contained in our brief under point l also
applies to point 2. This case might be very different had
respondent offered evidence supporting such a finding but
there is not a word of evidence to support this finding. Appellant did not stipulate to such evidence nor was appellant
requested to so stipulate. It appears that the whole question
as to whether appellant can be held liable or whether appellant cannot be held liable for the debt rests on such a
finding, but the finding must be supported by the evidence.
Of course appellant would not have stipulated to evidence
which would have supported this finding, otherwise appellant might have had no defense to the action. Then too, appellant would be entitled to know whether all or what part
of the services rende:red were claimed to be necessary for the

'
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preservation of the life and health of the son. The record
is wholly deplete of evidence showing the necessity fer keeping the boy in the hospital for over two months time.
Appellant is m\indful of the law and authorities which,
under ordinary circumstances, make a father liable for the
necessaries of life furnished his children even though the
father is deprived of their custody by a decree of divorce.
The evidence in this case does not bring us within the rule
laid down by such authorities. Even under those cases decided in jurisdictions which have been called upon to decide
cases where necessaries are involved without question as to
whether the claim is or is not for necessaries of life, we find
courts holding that an independent action cannot be brought
against the father. Such a decision is handed dmvn by the
courts of Michigan.
In Judson v Judson, 171 lVIich. 185, 137 N.W. 103
wherein the court held that a mother '"·ho obtained a decree
of divorce in another state awarding the custody of a child
to her, without providing for their support or for alimony,
cannot maintain a suit in equity in Michigan to compel the
father to make provision for the future support of herself and
the child.
In 20 ALR page 827 we find the following:
"In Burritt v Burritt ( 1859) 29 Barb. N.Y. 124,
denying recovery in an action by the mother against the
father for the support of an infant child whose custody
had been a warded to the m(other by a decree of divorce
in another state, which made no provision for the support
of the child, the court said that the award of the care
and custody of the child to the mother must be pre·
sumed to carry with it the obligation to support, in the
absence of, evidence to the contrary; or, at least, to
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relieve the father from the obligation to furnish such
support upon the call of the mother; and that to make
the father liable in such case there must be special circumstances averred in the complaint or appearing in
the evidence, from which the obligation must arise or
may be reasonably inferred." (Italics ours)
Point 3.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL.
Upon the conclusion of the stipulation of counsel for
respondent and appellant and upon respondent resting, appellant moved for a dismissal on the grounds of lack of
evidence to prove respondent's case. Appellant pointed out
to the court the failure on the part of respondent to show
that the mother of the child who was awarded custody had
failed and refused to pay the claim or that she had made
payment thereon and that demand for payment had first been
made upon her. Appellant was entitled to know whether
demand had been made upon the mother for payment and
whether if demand had been made the mother had failed and
refused to pay the account, or whether the mother had made
some payment on the account.
In Harris v Harris, 5 Kan. 46 it was held that when a
woman is divorced from her husband, the latter is not exclusively liable for the support of their children. The duty is
as much the mother as the father.
Appellant's motion to dismiss also pointed out the fact
that there was no modification of the decree of divorce.
There was no showing that there was no other source, except
through the father, for the payment of said account, no property real or personal from which payment mlight be had.
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In Dodge v Keller (1927) 29 Ohio App 114, 162 NE
750, Annotated 7 ALR2d at page 494 we find the following:
"It was ruled that a divorced father was not liable
to an undertaker for the burial expenses of his minor
child, the undertaker having been engaged by the mother
without the father's request or subsequent promise to
pay for his services, where the divorce decree required
the father to pay $1,000 in stated instalments, for the
support of the child, whose custody had been awarded
the mother' and the father was faithfully performing
this obligation at the time the child died. The court
indicated however, that the proper rem'edy for the
mother would be for her to go into the court which had
rendered the divorce decree, and ask for a modification
of the same."

It appears that the courts of New York have followed
this same principal requiring a modification of the decree of
divorce in the case of Gellert v Gellert, 219 App Div 737,
219 NYS 820 and in Simon v Simon, 170 Mise 420 10
NYS2d 577.
Point 4.
THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT
AGAINST APPELLANT.
We are mindful of the fact that it appears from the majority rule from other jurisdictions involYing the question of
support for minor children in a case of divorce between parents where the decree makes no provision for support on the
part of the father and complete custody is awarded to the
mother, the father is not relieved from support. "\Ve have no
quarrel with such cases, but "·e contend the instant case is
not such a case. None of the cases so far as we have been
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able to find and they appear to be few in numJber are predicated on facts similar to those of the instant case. Here we
have the hospital running up a very sizeable account after the
father of the boy had advised its agents that he would not be
responsible for payment and then asking the court to hold that
the whole of this account comes within what is generally
designated common necessaries of life.
A distinction might be made in those cases where a child
whose custody has been awarded to the mother under a
divorce decree, becomes ill or becomes in need of dental care
or requires the common necessaries of life, and a case such
as we have here where the father having been deprived of
custody and the society of the boy, has no control whatsoever
over the boy who is permitted by the mother who is awarded
custody and control to place himself in a position which re·
suits in injury to the boy. The father in this case cannot
and should not be held under a guise of such care being within
those cases requiring the father to provide common necessaries of life.
Of course medical care and hospital care under certain
conditions are necessaries of life but when the father has no
control over the instrumentality which brings about the con·
dition requiring such care, then we say it comes within an
exception to the general rule.
Now let us examine the account on which the claim is
based. It is evident therefrom that the boy was hospitalized
from November 18th, 1954 to Feb. 23, 1955 a period of in
excess of two months. How much of that time was actually
necessary for the boy to reilljain at the hospital? Had the
mother not expected the father to pay the bill would she
not have taken the boy to her home and nursed him there?
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Or had the boy been under the custody of the father might the
father not have taken the boy to his home and nursed him
there. This fact is forcefully evident from the charges for
surgery as reflected by the account, once on Nov. 18, 1954
the day of entry and once on Jan. 14, 1955 when it appears
a cast was furnished. At any rate a part of the time of convalescing might have been at home and not at the hospital.
CONCLUSION
The respondent having failed to show that the services
rendered were necessary for the preservation of the life and
health of the son, that no source of payment other than from
the appellant was available, that demand had been made on
the mother of the boy and that the mother had failed and
refused to pay the account, the judgment sould be reversed.
Wherefore appellant prays that the judgment entered
herein be vacated and that appellant have judgment for his
costs including costs of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
Milton V. Backman of
Backman, Backman & Clark,
Attorneys for defendant and appellant.

Received copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
this ...... day of February, 1957.

Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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